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Unequal investors: questioning the ethicality of Australia’s financial sector 
 
Introduction 
In an age of global disquiet about the power and ability of large companies to influence the 
social fabric of the countries in which they operate, citizens around the world are 
increasingly voicing their concerns and questions about whose interests are being served by 
the activities of these powerful institutions.  The rise of the Occupy movement, class actions 
against banks about ‘unfair’ fees, and the fallout from the News International phone hacking 
scandal denote citizens’ refusal to remain passive about their discontent.  There is now a 
growing clamour for international companies to acknowledge that citizens and communities 
are legitimate business stakeholders with the right to have a say in corporate goal-setting 
and decision-making.  We argue that because corporate public relations fails to 
acknowledge the diversity of business stakeholders, it privileges the views and voices of a 
single elite group, in effect, marginalising those of other stakeholders.  Overlooked most 
notably are citizens who contribute to superannuation and pension schemes, because it is 
their financial savings that provide the capital on which large companies and economies are 
based.   We focus our study on one major sector of the Australian economy, showing the 
implications of its communication activities for all Australian citizens and for the Australian 
economy.  We suggest that corporate public relations cannot begin to be ethical and socially 
responsible, and business cannot be fully effective, until the hierarchical separation of 
stakeholders is eradicated and account taken of all stakeholder views and voices. 
While there have always been power differentials in society, scholars have argued that the 
emergence of big business has accentuated these.  In the modern economy, corporations 
wield great power over people and society (Bakan 2004) with public relations intimately tied 
to a corporate agenda that fosters a system of dominant-subordinate relations, 
underpinned by a manipulative ideology (Munshi and Kurian 2005).   Munshi and Kurian 
argue that public relations promotes this inequitable distribution of power among 
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stakeholders, because in communication campaigns and strategies certain key stakeholders  
are prioritised over those who are deemed to be peripheral and therefore unworthy of 
public relations attention.  Positioned at the top of this ‘asymmetric hierarchy’ (p.514) are 
shareholders, a group with an obsessive focus on profits and share prices.  Because Munshi 
and Kurian’s main research interest is on diversity in relation to the First and Third World, 
they then go on to identify other groups of stakeholders but these are less relevant for our 
particular concern, which is with the financial sector of Australia and with discrimination 
within the stakeholder group known as investors or shareholders.  Nevertheless, the notion 
of an asymmetric hierarchy is of interest to us because it is able to reveal how corporate 
public relations, working on behalf of a powerful elite (that is, senior management) 
separates, prioritises and, in effect, discriminates against certain stakeholders.   
Australia’s financial sector 
In Australia, as in other capitalist economies, a broad and diverse base of investors provide 
the economic capital that allows businesses to function.   Organisations and individuals, 
through their investments, take a stake in listed companies in the form of shares which are a 
portion of the value of each company invested in.   In many cases, monies are invested and 
managed on behalf of others by companies known as institutional investors, which includes 
superannuation funds.  These companies manage large sums of money owned by, for 
example, a sole investing organisation, or they pool smaller amounts from a number of 
investors into a single investment fund.   
Around 40% of Australia’s equity market and 30% of Australia’s bond market are owned by 
Australian institutional investors, predominantly superannuation funds (Black and Kirkwood 
2010).  Therefore, a substantial portion of the capital that fuels the daily activities and 
growth of major national and international companies is provided by superannuation funds 
which, in turn, are funded by individual citizens who invest in these funds for their 
retirement through their regular savings.  In Australia, over 70% of the adult population 
have some level of superannuation savings, and of those aged between 25 and 54, this 
figure increases to 87% (Allen Consulting 2011).  In effect, then, it is the citizens of Australia 
who are the real owners of the capital that sustains the operations of national and 
international listed companies. Despite this fact and also the recent demands of citizens for 
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greater corporate engagement, individuals are rarely acknowledged by the superannuation 
funds and listed companies as having the right to a say in the activities and outcomes of 
business.  Research by the Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation (Ramsay, 
Stapleton and Fong 1998) and by other industry and government bodies indicates that 
institutional investment companies such as superannuation funds do not seek to engage 
with the individual investors whose money they manage, nor do they gather their views and 
seek to understand their concerns.  Instead, the views of large shareholders and senior 
managers are privileged, with the interests of individual investors not taken account of, 
despite the fact that they are the real owners of corporate capital and therefore legitimate 
corporate stakeholders.   
Literature review 
In the management literature, there are competing views of the corporation and how it 
should be managed.  Agency theory and stakeholder theory have been described as polar 
opposites because of their contrasting views about management assumptions and 
processes (Shankman 1999).  We argue that both are useful in explaining corporate public 
relations in the financial sector. 
Traditionally, agency theory has been used to explain the nature of the implicit and explicit 
contractual relationships that exist between an organisation’s various constituents and its 
management (eg Eisenhardt 1989, Fama 1980).  From this perspective shareholders, as the 
principals or owners of companies, are the primary constituents who delegate their 
decision-making rights to an agent (senior management).  Management has a fiduciary duty 
to maximise profits and thus ensure that the highest returns possible are achieved.  The 
effect of this relationship is that senior managers are considered an elite group whose 
powerful position and ability to privilege or disadvantage various relationships is legitimised 
by large shareholders.  When a shareholder base is diverse and diffused (such as when there 
are multiple large and small investors), then smaller investors or shareholders have difficulty 
in exerting any power over the agent.    
While agency theory still has currency in justifying current management practice including 
managers’ presumption of their right to make decisions on behalf of investors, recent 
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scholarship has suggested that this perspective is limited and should be either 
complemented with stakeholder theory (Hill and Jones 1992), or subsumed within it 
(Shankman 1999) because stakeholder theory offers a more appropriate and moral means 
of informing contemporary management practice, as well offering the possibility of giving a 
the right to property and decision rights to broader range of stakeholders (Janssen 2005).  
Public relations research has not engaged with agency thinking, but there is a growing body 
of work examining stakeholder relationships in public relations, such as De Bussy (2008; De 
Bussy and Kelly 2010) and Mackey (2006). 
Stakeholder theory posits that at the heart of management and corporate governance are 
interdependent relationships with a range of diverse stakeholders (Shankman 1999:323).  
Writing about public relations, De Bussy (2008) states that ‘managing stakeholder 
relationships is – or should be – the core business of public relations, whether in business, 
politics or other organisational settings’.  Therefore, he posits that it is ‘of the utmost 
importance’ that more studies be conducted into stakeholder relationships in order to 
develop theory within the context of public relations’.   Holzhausen (2011) agrees.   Drawing 
on studies from South Africa (2005), she argues that taxpayers and the communities in 
which organisations operate are just as much principals in these organisations as are 
shareholders.  Unless all stakeholders are addressed in public relations activities, then 
‘organisations will be unsustainable because an organisation that does not adhere to the 
value system of its environment will be shut down’ (Holtzhausen 2011:158).  We have 
already noted the work of Munshi and Kurian (2005) who have drawn attention to the 
discrimination that occurs when stakeholders are hierarchically separated in communication 
campaigns.  Questioning the ethicality of the notion of a hierarchy of stakeholders, de Bussy 
and Kelly write that, ’To continually overlook the concerns of the legitimate in favour of the 
interests of the “merely” powerful is far from an ideal state of affairs… The voices of the 
legitimate but powerless should, at a minimum, have the opportunity to counterbalance the 
clamouring of the powerful (2010: 301). 
To date, little academic research has examined stakeholder involvement and participation in 
the financial sector.  In particular, there is scarce research on the hegemonic role of senior 
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management as the agent of shareholders, and the role of public relations in reinforcing this 
position. Most previous research has focused on: 
• the increasing importance of superannuation funds as a source of capital in Australia 
and the impact of the regulatory changes to compulsory retirement savings in the 
field of business studies, such as the work of Ramsay, Stapleton and Fong (1998), 
Black and Kirkwood (2010) and Liu and Arnold (2010); and  
• the rise of stakeholders, other than shareholders, and their influence on how 
companies communicate in the field of communication studies, such as Arnt Aune 
(2007) and Waddock (2007). 
• organisational stakeholders in non-financial sectors, such as de Bussy and Kelly 
(2010), Holzhausen (2011), and Munshi and Kurian (2005)  
In developing our literature review beyond this abstract, we will build on the work of the 
above authors and also further a discussion of ethics, by drawing on, for example, the work 
of Fitzpatrick and Gauthier (2001), Raupp (2012) and L’Etang et al (2012). 
Methodology 
Our study is situated in Australia’s financial sector.  Our review of the literature led us to 
investigate the following questions:   
• How do companies and institutional investors identify and engage with different 
stakeholder groups, and what is the role of public relations in this process?  
• Do institutional investors such as superannuation funds acknowledge that individual 
investors are the real owners of the assets in which they invest, or is there a 
hierarchical separation of stakeholders?   
• What are the likely outcomes for Australian society of the above practices? 
We employed a critical discourse analysis approach to analyse the websites, annual reports 
and sustainability reports of five of the largest companies listed on the Australian Stock 
Exchange, and five of the largest superannuation funds which manage superannuation fund 
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members’ contributions1. The five listed companies are BHP Billiton Ltd, Woolworths Ltd, 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd, Telstra Corporation Ltd and Wesfarmers Ltd.   
The size of these companies means they have some influence over the lives of Australians 
and the social fabric of Australia, as well as over government policy through professional 
lobbying and participation in industry association bodies.  Australians interact with these 
organisations in many ways as employees, contractors, sub-contractors, customers, 
suppliers and neighbours.  
The five superannuation funds included in the sample are AMP Superannuation Savings 
Trust, Colonial First State FirstChoice Superannuation Trust, AustralianSuper, The Universal 
Super Scheme and UniSuper. These funds were chosen because they are five of the largest 
superannuation funds in Australia, and represent a mix of private retail funds and industry 
funds. 
The 2010/2011 annual reports of the chosen listed companies and superannuation funds, 
and also the corporate responsibility reports of the listed companies were examined and 
compared to reveal:  (a) whom each company identified as (i) stakeholders and (ii) 
shareholders, and if there was any distinction communicatively between large shareholders 
and small investors; (b) the language, content and genres employed to communicate with 
the different stakeholder groups and if there was any distinction in the language, content 
and genres that targeted large shareholders vis ᾲ vis small investors. The summaries at the 
start of the each report, provided by the Chief Executive/Managing Director and Chairman, 
were a particular focus as examples direct written communication between the highest level 
of management within these institutions and the targeted stakeholder group.Websites of 
the companies and superannuation funds were analysed in order to understand how the 
organisations engaged with their members, and the extent to which the structure and 
content of the website constrained or facilitated engagement with shareholders and 
investors.  With regard to the superannuation funds, the analysis also focused on the extent 
                                                          
1 This study refers to money invested by Australians in superannuation funds only and does 
not take into account money invested in the stock and bond markets through separate 
investments  
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to which companies and superannuation funds acknowledged superannuation members 
(individual investors) as the providers of capital for the underlying investments, and if the 
structure and content invited fund members to contribute to discussions about how funds 
were invested.   Themes emerged inductively from the data and we used these to structure 
the following presentation of findings.   
Findings 
In this section, we briefly summarise some of our initial findings as they relate to two key 
themes: proximity and access, and transparency and opacity.   In the developed paper, we 
will present the findings in specific detail with quotations.   
Proximity and access 
An indicator of the salience of a stakeholder group to an organisation is the method of 
communication (or genre) an organisation uses to engage with each stakeholder group, and 
the access each stakeholder group has to senior management.  In the case of all of the listed 
companies the data indicate that stakeholders were prioritised differently, with a clear 
distinction evident in terms of the proximity that companies allowed to senior management 
and boards.  Current and potential professional investors (including market analysts) had 
greater access to the upper echelons of management and the boards through briefings and 
smaller meetings. Other shareholders, such as small retail shareholders, had access at 
annual general meetings and through the websites, although the opportunity for closer 
interaction with senior management was not apparently available.  
Listed companies made great efforts to regularly dialogue in a variety of ways with 
professional and potential investors and shareholder groups, presenting their engagement 
policies and practices on their websites and in publicly available reports.   However, with the 
exception of two companies, the listed companies were less forthcoming about how other 
stakeholders might access information or have a say in investment decisions.  In the case of 
the majority, there was little or unclear detail about mechanisms for contacting or 
interacting with corporate executives.   Two companies did provide information about how 
to gain access to company representatives, usually through public meetings or community 
events (and then only to executives at lower management levels) or via the highly controlled 
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channel of the website.  Therefore, in the case of the limited companies, the data indicate 
that individual superannuation fund members were provided with no access to senior 
management and little opportunity to engage with their corporate communication 
activities. 
The lack of access to management by small investors was further evidenced in the language 
that the superannuation funds used on their websites and in corporate reports.  Individuals’ 
accounts were referred to as ‘yours’ whereas financial investments were described as ‘ours’, 
thus implying that investment capital was the property of the superannuation funds.  This 
disregarded the fact that the capital was supplied in the first place to the superannuation 
funds by individual members.  Such discursive strategies encourage the notion that 
professional investors, on behalf of superannuation funds, are the rightful owners or agents 
of capital and therefore take priority among stakeholders who are ranked hierarchically.   
Transparency and opacity 
The salience of stakeholder groups is highlighted not only by the genre selected for 
corporate communication, or the extent of access allowed to senior management, but also 
by the content of corporate messages that are targeted at different stakeholder groups.  
When communicating with shareholders and institutional investment companies, the listed 
companies employed a financial discourse, evidenced in the reporting of results as well as 
analyses about the impact of external events on the companies’ commercial interests. The 
investor centres of all the companies’ websites provided information on business 
development, financial information and the impact this had on investment accounts.  These 
communication strategies were designed to resonate with shareholders and institutional 
investors whose priorities are share values and profits.  There was little information about 
how each company was run, how its operations impacted on local or national communities, 
or the company’s corporate responsibility role in shaping Australian society.  
With regard to the superannuation funds, information was opaque about how professional 
investors made investment decisions on behalf of individual superannuation members. In 
the sections of the websites labelled ‘members’ there was only information about individual 
account performance and administration of that account.  None of the communications of 
the superannuation funds linked members’ monies with the listed corporate assets which 
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benefitted from their capital, thus obfuscating the connection between the provision of 
capital by superannuation members and the investment funds where they could rightfully 
claim a stake.  Indeed, once citizens’ monies had been invested by superannuation funds, it 
then appeared to become the property of professional investors who managed and invested 
it into ‘our investments’.  This use of language encourages the notion that there has been a 
change of ownership of money, thus ensuring that superannuation funds have ‘agency’ and 
control over investment decisions without any recourse to the views and voices of individual 
superannuation contributors as investors. 
Conclusion 
Dealing with investor stakeholders as monolithic group is to overlook the complexity and 
nuance of stakeholder relations in Australia’s financial sector.  Stakeholders involved in 
investing, managing or advising on investments are diverse and range from individual 
citizens who contribute to superannuation funds through their regular savings, to 
professional investment managers, institutional investors, shareholders and also listed 
companies, with managers of companies and funds acting as agents on behalf of large and 
small investors, including shareholders.   While most scholars tend to categorize 
shareholders as important and privileged stakeholders, our data suggest that even within 
the shareholder or investor stakeholder group there is privilege and disadvantage.   Our 
data indicate that there is a separation of investor stakeholders along hierarchical lines with 
certain groups of investors occupying more powerful positions than others.   Listed 
companies and superannuation funds pay greater attention in their corporate 
communications to the views and voices of professional investors, institutional shareholders 
and potential professional investors (including market analysts).   These stakeholders are 
supplied with information relevant to their investment interests and imperatives, and also 
are granted greater proximity to the senior management and the boards of the companies 
in which they invest through financial briefings and informal meetings. Other shareholders, 
such as small retail shareholders, have access to financial information on websites and also 
at annual general meetings, although the opportunity to meet with and influence the 
investment decisions of the senior management of companies in which they invest is not 
available (although there is some access offered to lower level managers). Superannuation 
fund members, the providers of capital to many of the institutional investment groups, have 
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no access at all and are not acknowledged as the real owners of the financial foundations on 
which the Australian economy is constructed.  In effect, a small, elite group of professional 
investors are most influential in driving corporate investment decisions and there is no 
evidence that these stakeholders canvas the views and values of the citizens who provide 
them with the money for investment. 
In the conclusion of our developed paper, we will apply an ethical perspective to develop 
theoretical propositions concerning the ethicality of communication practices in the 
financial sector.  We will also note the broader societal and economic consequences for 
Australia when citizens, as the real owners of the capital that supports the country’s assets 
and major corporations, are overlooked in both corporate public relations and investment 
decision-making. 
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